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Abstract. The purpose of the paper is two-fold. The paper compares productivity of 
Russian firms that received foreign direct investments, and fully domestically owned firms. It 
also analyses spillovers from foreign-owned firms to domestic firms. Foreign firms are found 
to be more productive than the domestic ones, however, poor progress of reform in the region 
negatively affects productivity of foreign-owned firms. At the same time, there are positive 
spillovers between foreign-owned and domestic firms. This effect if particularly strong in the 
case of medium-sized firms (between 200 and 1000 employees), while spillovers on small 
firms are negative. The stock of human capital in the region is one of the main factors, which 
helps domestic firms to benefit from the entry of foreing firms. (JEL F2, O3) 
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At the outset of transition, it was expected that foreign direct investment (FDI) will 
become one of the major sources of growth in transition economies. Given high level of 
human capital in transition economies, lack of capital and technological know-how was 
considered as one of the major impediments to development in these countries. Foreign direct 
investment is one of the easiest ways to overcome these problems. On the one hand, FDI 
results in direct import of new capital and new technologies in the country. On the other hand, 
it is supposed to be easier for domestic firms to copy technologies of foreign-owned firms 
located nearby than trying to reproduce a technology used in manufacturing imported goods. 
Therefore, FDI was expected to become one of the most important ways of technological 
upgrading of Russian firms. Another important reason for welcoming foreign investors in 
transition economies is potential spin-offs of western managerial techniques. In planned 
economies, the behavior of managers was absolutely different from that in market economies. 
Managers were required to meet plan targets instead of maximizing their firms' profits. This 
created the wrong incentives for the managers. Instead of trying to improve firms' efficiency, 
decrease costs and increase profits, managers in planned economies were fighting for 
government subsidies and renegotiating plans for their firms with the government. There was 
no business culture in the Western sense of the word. In this situation, foreign-owned firms 
could serve as an example for domestic firms of how managers should behave. 
In addition to the transfers of technologies and managerial techniques, foreign entry 
increases competition, thus forcing domestic firms to restructure faster. Restructuring can take 
the form of technological improvements and improvement in corporate governance, changes 
in the range and quality of goods produced. However, foreign competition may also have a 
negative effect on domestic firms, particularly at the beginning of transition. Those can be 
driven out of the market by more efficient foreign competitors. Given that most firms in 
transition economies were inefficient, this development should not be regarded as negative, as 
it is just a result of replacement of inefficient firms by more efficient ones. 
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In this paper we study the effect of foreign direct investment on productivity based on 
the Russian experience. Despite the abundant natural resources and skilled labor force, the 
inflow of FDI to Russia was rather small in comparison with more advanced transition 
economies. The average annual per capita inflow of FDI to Russia in 1994-1998 was about 
US$ 17, which is more than ten times as little as $220 received by Hungary or $134 received 
by Czech Republic.6  Such a low level of foreign direct investments can be explained by both 
political and economic factors. In this paper, we do not look at the factors that determines the 
decision of foreign firms to invest. An accompanying paper by Manaenkov (2000) looks at 
such factors in greater detail. The purpose of this paper is to make an attempt to assess the 
impact of FDI on domestic economy. We use a dataset that includes all partially or fully 
foreign-owned firms that existed in Russia in 1992-1997, and all medium-sized and large as 
well as some of small domestic firms to assess the relative productivity of foreign-owned and 
domestic firms and the effect of FDI on domestic firms. Konings (1999) is a similar study of 
the effect of foreign investment on firms in Eastern European transition economies. He finds 
that foreign firms are more productive than domestic ones in all the countries of his study. 
However, the spillover effect is negative for domestic firms. Therefore, he finds that the 
market stealing effect is predominant at the initial stages of transition. In other words, he finds 
that foreign firms, which are more efficient, have advantage over domestic ones, and drive 
domestic firms out of the market. Potential technological and corporate governance spillovers 
cannot outweigh this effect. Unfortunately, it is not clear in the Konings (1999) paper if the 
time-specific fixed effect is controlled for. Controlling for this effect changes our results 
dramatically, so, it is conceivable that negative spillovers observed by Konings are just a 
result of misspecification. 
Konings result is consistent with previous findings by Aitken and Harrison (1999), 
who study the FDI spillovers to domestic firms in Venezuela. Aitken and Harrison find that 
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the spillover effect is negative. Their interpretation is .that foreign firms steal demand from 
domestic ones, and, therefore, force domestic firms to cut output and produce in the less 
efficient part of the costs curve. Other studies, such as Blomstrom and Sjoholm (1999), 
Blomstrom and Persson (1983) document positive spillovers from foreign-owned to domestic 
firms in developing countries.7  However, these early studies were criticized by Aitken and 
Harrison (1999) because they use cross-section data, and, therefore, do not take the firms' 
specific fixed effect into account. 
Our results for productivity differences between foreign-owned and domestic firms 
and for spillovers from foreign-owned to domestic firms are as follows. Foreign-owned firms 
were found to be more efficient than domestic ones. Our interpretation of this finding is that 
foreign-owned firms restructure faster than domestic ones, and, in addition, they have access 
to better technologies and are better managed. Intervention of local authorities in restructuring 
of foreign-owned firms can scare off investors and slow down the restructuring process. The 
regression results show that foreign-owned firms are more productive if located in reform-
oriented regions, suggesting that faster reforming regions do not intervene in the restructuring 
of foreign-owned firms, and, therefore, attract more productive investments. 
As far as spillovers from foreign-owned to domestic firms are concerned, the direction 
of such spillovers depends on the size of domestic firms. Small firms, with less than 200 
employees, are negatively affected by the entry of foreign firms. Total factor productivity of 
such domestic firms goes down with an increase in the share of foreign-owned firms in the 
total production of the industry. On the other hand, foreign direct investments seem to have 
positive influence on domestic firms with 200-1000 employees.8  Total factor productivity of 
such firms goes up with an increase in the share of foreign presence in the industry. 
Therefore, we have indirect evidence that medium-sized domestic firms tend to restructure 
                                                          
7 The literature on spillovers from multinationals on domestic firms is surveyed in Blomstrom and Kokko 
(1998). 
8 Foreign-owned firms in Russia are on average very small, with less than 100 employees. Hence, we confined 
our analysis to firms with less than 1000 employees. 
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faster facing increased competition from the foreign-owned firms. The difference in the 
behavior of small and medium-sized firms can be explained by differences in the access to 
financial resources between the two groups of firms. While access to external sources of 
finance is problematic for all Russian firms, this problem is particular severe for the small 
firms. 
Following Aitken and Harrison (1999), we also test for local spillovers. It is 
conceivable that technological and corporate governance spillovers happen faster among 
firms located within one region than among those located in different regions. Labor turnover 
is higher inside regions than across regions, and it is easier to copy technology or a 
managerial style of a nearby competitor, than those of a competitor located far away. 
Therefore we would expect a higher chance of positive spillovers on the local level. However, 
as in the case of the Aitken and Harrison (1999) paper, we also do not find positive local 
spillovers. On the contrary, we find strong negative spillovers, suggesting that the competition 
effect is predominant on the local level. This is true of firms of all sizes. 
One of the most interesting of our findings is that the spillover effect depends 
positively on the level of education in the region. The higher is the proportion of population 
with secondary education, the higher are spillovers. This is true of firms of both size groups. 
A plausible explanation for this finding is that better educated managers and workers have a 
greater potential for copying technologies and managerial techniques from foreign firms. 
Therefore, our paper finds additional evidence of the importance of human capital as a factor 
of production. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we give a short review of the 
historical developments and current situation with foreign direct investment in Russia. This 
section also contains a review of data sources. In Section 2 we present the results regarding 
relative productivity of domestic and foreign-owned firms. Section 3 summarizes the results 
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regarding spillovers from foreign-owned to domestically-owned firms, and Section 4 
concludes. 
1. Basic Facts about FDI in Russia and Data Description 
 
The latest wave of FDI in Russia started in Gorbachev's times after the Law on Joint 
Ventures with Firms from Capitalist Countries was passed. This law allowed only 
establishing joint ventures between domestic and foreign firms. In July 1991, the new law On 
Foreign Investment in Russia was adopted, which allowed opening in Russia of fully-owned 
foreign firms' subsidiaries. The initial inflow of foreign investment was very slow: according 
to Goskomstat, at the end of 1992 only 2533 foreign-owned firms were operating in Russia. 
The number of foreign-owned firms increased to more than 16000 by the end of 1996 but has 
declined slightly since then. In addition to general economic factors, such as macroeconomic 
uncertainty, and poor corporate governance, the inflow of foreign direct investments was 
slowed down by the government regulations. The Russian Privatization Program set limits on 
the participation of foreign firms in the privatization of some enterprises. Permission for 
participation of foreign firms in the privatization of firms in the oil, gas, ''strategic'' materials, 
nuclear elements and some other industries was supposed to be issued by the Government of 
Russia or by the Sub-National Governments on a case by case basis9.  Privatization by foreign 
firms of firms with less than 200 employees was decided upon by regional governments, some 
of which were hostile to foreign investors. On the other hand, the Law on Production Sharing 
Agreements, i.e., the major law that regulates foreign presence in natural resources industries, 
was passed only in December 1995. Moreover, no production sharing agreements were signed 
until 1999, when the Law on Production Sharing Agreements was changed, and the new law, 
                                                          
9 See, for example, Presidential Decree signed on December 24, 1993. The Privatization Program, also envisaged 
that the decision about participation of foreign firms in the privatization of small firms with less than 200 
employees were taken by the local authorities. More of the discussion of limits to foreign investments is in 
Bergsman, Broadman, and Drebentsov (2000). 
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bringing amendments to the Russian legislation in line with the Law on Production Sharing 
Agreements was passed.10 
The firm level data used in this paper come from two sources: the Registry of Foreign 
Owned Firms, and the Russian Enterprise Registry Longitudinal Database (RERLD). These 
are the yearly enterprise censuses conducted by the Russian Statistical Agency (Goskomstat). 
The registries contain firm level information on output, number of employees, book value of 
capital, total costs, export and import, and some other variables. The Registry of Foreign-
Owned Firms includes all fully or partially foreign-owned firms operating in Russia. The 
RERLD includes all Russian industrial firms with over 100 employees, all state-owned firms, 
and non-state firms with fewer than 100 employees that are up to 75% individually owned. It 
excludes firms with fewer than 100 employees that are more than 75% individually owned. 
Both datasets were cleaned of outliers, and, data permitting, missing values were replaced by 
the corresponding values from the censuses of subsequent years. Some missing values were 
obtained from the statistical part of the GNOZIS database.11 As a result of this data-cleaning 
procedures, some of the summary statistics, which we report below, differ from the 
information published by Goskomstat. The before-cleaning summary statistics from the 
Registry of Foreign Owned Firms database were identical to the ones published by 
Goskomstat in the Information On the Foreign-Owned Firms part of its yearbook. 
While this, to our knowledge, is the first paper that uses the Registry of Foreign-
Owned Firms database, the RERLD was used before in the studies of Russian firms' 
restructuring. The description of RERLD can be found in other papers, for example, Brown 
and Brown (1999), so we will skip it and only provide a description of the Registry of 
Foreign-Owned Firms database. 
                                                          
10 For more details, see Afontsev (2000). 
11 GNOZIS is the database, which includes statistical and balance sheet information on Russian firms. The firms 
coverage in GNOZIS is close to the one in the Russian Enterprise Longitudinal Database. 
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The Registry of Foreign-Owned Firms covers the period between 1992 and 1997. It 
includes firms in all sectors of the economy. The sectoral breakdown is the following. 
Industry is the sector that attracted most foreign direct investment: in 1997, about 49% of 
foreign-owned firms' output was produced by manufacturing firms. The second largest sector 
is trade, which accounted for 29% of all output of foreign-owned firms in 1997, followed by 
transportation and communication, which accounted for only 10% of the total output of 
foreign-owned firms. The share of construction and housing is less than 4 percent each. 
Since we only have information on domestic firms in the manufacturing sector, we 
describe foreign manufacturing firms in greater detail. Figure 1 shows a breakdown of total 
output of industrial foreign-owned firms by industries in 1997. Food processing and fuel 
industries account for the largest shares of output (28% and 24% respectively), followed by 
manufacturing (15%), chemicals (8%), and wood (7%). Such composition of output suggests 
two major determinants of foreign investment in Russia: Russian natural resources and its 
potentially large market for consumer products. 
Figure 1 
Breakdown of Output by Industry, 1997
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As we have mentioned, the inflow of FDI to Russia to date was rather small which is 
evidenced by the share of foreign-owned firms in total production. In 1992 this share for all 
manufacturing firms was 3%, increasing to only 4.5% by the end of 1997. The dynamics was 
 9 
not the same across industries, though Figure 2 shows a change in the share of foreign-owned 
firms in the total output across industries. The diagram shows that at the beginning of 
transition the share of foreign-owned firms in the total output was about of 2-3% in most of 
the industries. The main exception was the wood industry, where this share was almost 6% as 
early as in 1992.12  In the following years, the share of foreign-owned firms in the total output 
of such industries as chemicals, machinery, construction and textile, increased substantially. 
The most remarkable example is the food processing industry, where the share of foreign 
firms increased from about 3% in 1992 to almost 11% in 1997. On the other hand, the foreign 
share was stagnant in exporting industries, such as fuel and metals. This might have resulted 
from both federal and regional authorities policies toward foreign direct investment in 
extracting industries. As we said above, some limits on participation of foreign firms in 
privatization and establishment of new firms in the natural resources industries were set by 
the privatization programs, and by the delay in the adoption of the Law on Production Sharing 
Agreements. 
Figure 2 
Share of Output of Foreign Owned Firms in Total Output
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12 We have some doubts as to the accuracy of the data on foreign-owned firms in the wood industry. The 
problem is that most of these firms had a foreign owner resident in Cyprus. Cyprus does not strike us as a 
country specializing in woodworking or furniture production, while it is an offshore zone where a lot of offshore 
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The largest investor in Russian economy is the USA (in 1997, American-owned firms 
accounted for 27.4% of foreign-owned firms' total output), followed by Germany (10.8%), the 
UK (9%), Switzerland (7.3%), Cyprus (5.5%), Ireland (5.5%), and Canada (4.4%). The shares 
of other countries are less than 4% each. American firms invested mainly in food processing 
(42% of American firms' total output in 1997), fuel (27%), and metallurgy (14%). German 
firms mainly invest in fuel (29%), machinery (27%), and chemicals (14%). The UK, again, 
invests mainly in food processing (40%), fuel (19%), and machinery (16%). Swiss firms 
concentrate in chemicals (38%) and fuel (35%). Most of the firms with the investor from 
Cyprus are operating in the fuel (30%), food processing (18%), and wood (17%) industries.13 
Almost all of the output of Irish firms is divided between the metal (62%) and food 
processing (31%) industries, while 94% of total output produced by Canadian firms is in the 
fuel sector. 
Following the Russian law, we define foreign direct investment as a purchase of at 
least 10% of shares in a Russian firm. In very few cases, firms from the Registry of the 
Foreign-Owned firms either did not provide information on foreign ownership or reported that 
the foreign share was less than 10%. We dropped these firms from the dataset. The Russian 
law on foreign direct investment does not impose the lower limit of investment. Since most of 
foreign firms in Russia are rather small, and since, as a consequence of high of inflation, it is 
difficult to compute the value of firms' assets in dollars, we do not put any asset size 
restriction on the sample either.14  The distribution of foreign ownership share across firms is 
as follows. In most cases, the foreign partner controls equal shares of 1/3, 1/2 or 100% of 
equity. In 1997, only 9% of foreign-owned firms had a less than 30% foreign stake. About 
26% of firms had a 30-49% foreign stake, another 44% were 50-90% foreign-owned, and at 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Russian firms and banks are located. Therefore, it is not unlikely that some of the firms which have the foreign 
investor from Cyprus are in fact domestically-owned firms. 
13 As we said above, we are not sure whether the firms with a foreign investor from Cyprus are real foreign-
owned firms or firms owned by a Cyprus subsidiary of a domestic firm. 
14 IMF defines foreign direct investment as a purchase of at least 10% of equity in a firm, where the value of 
assets is at least $500 ths. 
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the remaining 21% of firms the foreign share was above 90%. The average size of firms 
varies slightly among different ownership groups. Curious enough, firms with the lowest 
share of foreign ownership also have the smallest size by output: about Rb.14 bn or US$ 2.5 
mn. The average size of firms with the average share of foreign ownership from 30 to 49%, 
from 50 to 90%, and from 90 to 100% was US$ 4.4, 4.3, and 3.7 mn respectively. The 
distribution of foreign ownership does not vary substantially across industries and regions. 
The regional composition of foreign-owned firms is as follows. Not surprisingly, the 
regions with the largest share of foreign firms' total output are Moscow and Moscow oblast, 
Tyumen and St.Petersburg, followed by Tula oblast, Komi Republic, Vologda oblast, 
Krasnodarsky kray and Tatarstan. The smallest number of the foreign-owned firms is in Altai 
Republic, Jewish Autonomous Okrug, Dagestan and Karachaevo-Cherkessiya. 
The data set we use in the regressions is slightly different from the overall dataset we 
have. The difference is due to the fact that on average, foreign firms turned out to be much 
smaller than domestic ones. An average foreign-owned firm in the dataset has 73 employees, 
while domestic firms employ an average of 512 personnel. To decrease the potential size 
mismatch bias, we limited the analyses to the firms with between 5 and 1000 employees. The 
summary statistics for the sample used in the regressions are presented in the Table 4-1 in the 
Appendix. 
 
2. Comparison of Foreign-Owned and Domestic Firms' Productivity 
 
In this section we compare total factor productivity of foreign-owned and domestic 
firms. There is a number of reasons for foreign-owned firms to be more efficient than 
domestic ones. Parent companies based abroad can introduce new technologies in their 
domestic subsidiaries or joint ventures. Thus, the R&D capital in foreign-owned firms can be 
higher than in domestic ones. On the other hand, foreign-owned firms can benefit from 
 12 
managerial experience and distribution network of their foreign owners. Additionally, 
foreign-owned Russian firms can have access to the credit market abroad via their foreign 
parent companies, while Russian firms usually suffer from credit constraints.15  The latter 
factor makes accumulation of capital and R&D capital easier for foreign-owned firms in 
comparison with domestic firms. 
On the other hand, domestic firms have a number of advantages over the foreign-
owned ones, which makes then more productive. It is often argued that domestic firms know 
the domestic market better. In addition, domestic firms have connections in the regional 
administrations and federal government. Connections in the government allow domestic firms 
to evade taxes and use money surrogates and barter as well as to receive direct or indirect 
subsidies. Such soft budget constraints create a situation when domestic firms lack incentives 
to restructure. On the other hand, though, as a result of the soft budget constraints for 
domestic firms, foreign-owned firms can have higher costs than domestic ones, and therefore 
be less efficient. Direct intervention of local authorities in the operations of foreign-owned 
firms, which is observed in some regions, may also damage efficiency of these firms. 
Modern growth theory treats human capital and technological knowledge as an 
additional factor of production. Clearly, managerial techniques, sales networks, knowledge of 
the market, and other factors listed above, can also be considered as factors of production. 
Under this assumption, we can examine differences in total factor between foreign-owned and 
domestic firms by estimating the log-linear production function of the usual Cobb-Duglas 
form with constant return to scale:16 
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where y is the log of a firm's output, k is the log of fixed assets used in industrial production 
as of the beginning of the year, l is the log of total employment, i is the firm index and t is the 
                                                          
15 On the credit constraints of the Russian firms see N. Volchkova (2000), or Perotti, Gelfer (1998). 
 13 
year index. We use two different controls for foreign ownership: the dummy variable, which 
takes the value of one for fully or partially foreign-owned firms, and the actual share of the 
foreign partner in the firms. In the case when there are two or more foreign participants, we 
use the sum of foreign shares as an independent variable. The coefficient at the dummy for 
FDI measures difference in the total factor productivity between two groups of firms, foreign-
owned and domestically-owned ones. Using the share of the foreign partner allows 
differences in productivity in firms with different degree of foreign participation to be 
controlled for. 
The recent paper by Brown and Earle (2000) investigates a similar issue of 
comparative productivity of Russian firms with different ownership structures. The paper 
argues that a choice of the ownership type is not exogenous to the level of productivity. 
Brown and Earle show that non-state enterprises tend to have higher productivity in early 
years of transition, to face higher import competition, and to export less. These results suggest 
that our productivity regression may suffer from selection bias. Unfortunately, even though 
we have a panel dataset, we cannot use the firm-level fixed effect estimator to control for 
selection bias in production functions. Foreign-owned firms appear in the Registry of the FDI 
dataset only after receiving foreign investment, so controlling for the firm-level fixed effect 
will automatically exclude the effect of foreign ownership in the regressions that use dummy 
variable for FDI as a control variable. The size of foreign participation changed only in a very 
small number of cases, so applying a fixed effect estimator to the specification that includes 
the share of foreign partner as an independent variable, is not possible either. Therefore, we 
use two alternative methods of controlling for selection bias. The first method consists in 
estimating the production function (1) using industrial or regional dummies. Alternatively, we 
estimate equation (1) as a cross section using the treatment effect estimator. Brown and Earle 
(2000) propose using dummies for supervising Ministries as first stage treatment variables. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
16 We also estimated all equations using Cobb-Douglas function without constant return to scale restriction, and 
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They argue that Ministries had substantial influence on the decision process regarding 
privatization of enterprises. Unfortunately, as in the case of fixed effect, this method is not 
suitable in our case, because newly registered foreign-owned firms do not report any past 
affiliation with the ministries. As an alternative, we use dummy variables for small (less than 
200 employees) firms, and firms in oil, gas, and some other industries, which, as was 
mentioned above, were entitled to special treatment during the privatization process. As an 
alternative strategy, we use in the first-stage regressions some of the variables, which, 
according to Daniil Manaenkov (2000), affect the decision of foreign firms to invest. 
Manaenkov (2000) finds that the main determinants of FDI in Russia are the following: the 
proportion of people with secondary education in the region, concentration ratio in the 
industry, reform progress and quality of institutions in the regions, presence of other foreign 
firms in the industry or presence of other foreign firms from the same country in the regions 
(as an indicator of experience of foreign investors), Bank of Austria Risk Rating of Russian 
Regions, and the regional climate. We use some of these variables in the first stage of the 
treatment procedure. 
Measuring capital is a challenging task for the production function estimation in 
general and in Russia in particular. The firm level data we use contain information on fixed 
capital valued at the historical prices adjusted for inflation. Most of the capital was acquired 
by Russian firms at prices that existed in the planned economy, so they could be very different 
from prices prevailing in market economies. In addition, the fixed assets of some firms are 
very old and/or outdated, so the information we have on the value of capital may have very 
little to do with the true value of capital. Furthermore, the capital variable contains a lot of 
missing values, particularly in the case of foreign-owned firms. The largest number of 
observations of the value of capital of foreign-owned firms is in 1996, so we chose this year 
as the main year of our analysis. The number of non-missing observations for foreign-owned 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
using translog specification. The results were qualitatively very similar. 
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firms in the rest of the years is so small that we were unable to use the capital variable for 
those years.17  We reestimated all equations for all other years using the value of capital as 
reported in 1996. The assumption of the constant capital size is quite plausible for the case of 
Russian firms, since these firms invest almost nothing. The results are very similar across 
years, so we do not report results for all years, but only those for 1996 and, occasionally for 
1997. The results for other years are available upon request. 
In Table 2-1 we report the results of estimation of equation (1) using the 1996 data. 
The upper block of the table reports the specification, which uses fdi dummy, and the lower 
block reports the estimation results for the same equation, which instead of the dummy uses 
the share of the foreign partner. The estimation methods for both specifications are the same 
across columns. The qualitative results of both specifications are very similar, so we discuss 
them jointly. The first column presents the results of a simple OLS estimation of equation (1). 
The coefficient at the fdi dummy and, alternatively, at the fdi share, is positive and highly 
significant, suggesting that foreign-owned firms are more productive than domestic ones. The 
positive coefficient at the fdi share variable also means that the higher is the share of the 
foreign owner, the more productive is the firm. Inclusion of 2-digit industrial dummies 
(column 2) or regional dummies (column 3) does not affect the qualitative result, although the 
coefficients at the fdi dummy and the fdi share in the specification with regional dummies are 
slightly lower than in the first two specifications. Columns 4 and 5 report the results of the 
treatment effect estimation procedure for the specifications, where fdi dummy was used as an 
independent variable, and IV estimator in the case of the fdi share as a right-hand side 
variable. In the specification reported in column 4, the dummy for Moscow, the dummy for 
the industries where the decision on the participation of a foreign investor in the auction was 
taken by the federal government, the dummy for the firms with more than 200 employees, 
which is a proxy for the firms the decision on the privatization of which was taken on the 
                                                          
17 While the number of observations of fixed assets in foreign-owned firms in 1996 is around 3000, in other 
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level higher than the regional governments, and the reform progress index, were used as a first 
stage regressors.18  In the regression reported in column 5, we use as the first-stage regressors 
the percentage of adults with secondary education in the region, the dummy variable for 
Moscow and the proxy for economies of scale on a firm level constructed as the output of a 
firm divided by the output of an average firm in the 4-digit industry. The treatment effect and 
IV results are quite surprising. The coefficients at the fdi variables are not lower than in the 
OLS specifications, as we expected, but higher, particularly in the specifications reported in 
column 5.19  The only exception is the specification with the fdi dummy reported in the 
column 4. The coefficient at the fdi variable in this specification is slightly lower than the 
corresponding coefficient in the unrestricted OLS specification, but the difference is not 
significant. The finding that the fdi coefficients are higher in the treatment effect and IV 
specifications, suggests that FDI go into less productive rather than more productive 
industries. At first sight this results sounds rather surprising, but upon reflection it does not 
seem so unreasonable. It is absolutely rational for foreign investors to enter industries where 
they have substantial technological advantage. In such industries, foreign firms can control 
the market, and, therefore, make higher profits. In application to Russia this means that 
foreign firms tend to invest in the industries that were underdeveloped in the planned 
economy. The demand for products of such industries in Russia is quite high and is not met 
by noncompetitive domestic companies. On the other hand, privatization policy of the 
Russian government could have led to the same result. While, as we have already said, the 
participation of foreign firms in the privatization of enterprises in natural resources and some 
other highly profitable industries was rather limited, the Presidential Decree on Speeding up 
Privatization explicitly said that participation of foreign firms was especially encouraged in 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
years, only about 40 firms report capital. 
18More details on the construction of the reform progress index are provided below. 
19 This result is consistent with the finding of Brown and Earl (2000), who find that foreign-owned firms are 
more productive than all other firms, when specification bias is controlled for. Brown and Earl use the same 
dataset as we do, however, in contrast to our paper, they limit the analysis to the firms that existed in 1992. 
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the privatization of non-profitable firms, and firms that had to reduce production due to the 
lack of imported intermediate inputs.20 
Table 2-1. Productivity of Domestic and Foreign-Owned Firms in 1996. Log of Labor 
Productivity as Dependent Variable. 
 OLS OLS OLS Treatreg 1) Treatreg 2) 
Capital Intensity 0.16 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.10 
 [23.15]** [15.41]** [21.35]** [15.33]** [15.19]** 
fdi Dummy 0.90 0.84 0.52 0.88 1.39 
 [21.74]** [22.62]** [10.08]** [11.89]** [23.57]** 
Industry Dummies  inc.  inc.  
Regional Dummies   inc.  inc. 
Observations  14719 14719 14719 14698 14698 
R-squared  0.05 0.25 0.11   
 OLS OLS OLS Ivreg Ivreg 
Capital Intensity 0.16 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.15 
 [22.69]** [14.82]** [21.20]** [14.04]** [19.65]** 
fdi Share 1.46 1.36 0.87 1.63 3.99 
 [21.11]** [21.85]** [10.30]** [9.72]** [24.03]** 
Industry Dummies  inc.  inc.  
Regional Dummies   inc.  inc. 
Observations  14719 14719 14719 14698 14698 
R-squared  0.05 0.25 0.11 0.25 0.15 
Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets.* significant at the 5% level, ** significant at the 1% level 
1): Treatment variables/Instruments: Restricted Industries, Big Enterprises, Reforms, dummy for Moscow. 
2): Treatment variables/Instruments: Secondary Education, dummy for Moscow, Scale. 
 
Magnus Blomstrom and Frederik Sjoholm (1999) suggested that foreign-owned firms 
with a higher share of foreign ownership should be more efficient than firms with a small 
foreign stake. When a foreign owner has more control over a firm, he can choose to introduce 
more advanced technologies. In the Russian context, there is an additional factor that allows 
the majority foreign-owned firms to be more productive: the larger is the foreign stake, the 
more foreign managers are employed at the firm. Thus, firms with a big foreign stake should 
be better managed. On the other hand, there is substantial literature on the choice of a type of 
foreign investment by multinationals, which argues that joint ventures can be more profitable 
than fully-owned subsidiaries. Domestic firms have superior knowledge of the local product 
market, distributional networks, the local personnel's working habits, administrative culture 
and other local peculiarities. In addition, domestic firms may have connections among 
                                                          
20 See Presidential Decree on Speeding up Privitization of Federal and Municipal Enterprises of December 29, 
1991. 
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regional authorities, which is not the least important factor in Russia. Hence, joint ventures 
can avoid many problems of fully foreign-owned subsidiaries. Apart from that, the attitude of 
local administrations to joint ventures can be better than to 100% foreign firms. Therefore, the 
productivity of foreign firms can vary depending on the size of the foreign share. Regression 
specification, which includes the share of the foreign partner allows us to conclude that the 
higher is the foreign share, the more productive is the firm. The results of further tests of this 
hypothesis for the years 1996 and 1997 are reported in Table 2-2.21  The specifications, which 
we report in this table, allow non-linearities in the ownership effect to be controlled for. We 
divided all foreign firms into 4 groups according to the size of the foreign stake: firms where 
the foreign share is smaller than 30%, firms with a foreign ownership of 30% to 49%, firms 
with the foreign share between 50% and 90%, and 90% foreign-owned firms. The results are 
as follows. The productivity increases with the size of the foreign share. However, the 
difference is significant only in two cases. First of all, firms, where foreign owners have a 
minority stake, i.e., less than 30%, are significantly less productive than other firms. This 
result is the same in all specifications, which we tried. Hence, a smaller than 30% foreign 
stake is not sufficient to enforce fast restructuring or make foreign owner interested in 
installing modern technologies. On the other hand, firms with more than 90% of foreign stake 
are significantly more productive than others. This is an interesting result, as it contradicts the 
wide-spread belief that fully foreign-owned firms are less efficient than joint ventures since 
foreigners do not have sufficient knowledge of local market. Advantages of being the only 
owner of the firm, who has full control over the enterprise and does not have to look for a 
compromise with the Russian side seem to have outweighed the lack of knowledge of the 
market. 
 
 
                                                          
21 The results for other years are very similar. We proxy capital in 1997 with 1996 capital. 
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Table 2-2. Productivity of Foreign-Owned Firms by the Size of Foreign Ownership. Log 
of Labor Productivity as a Dependent Variable. 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
 OLS 96 OLS 96 OLS 96 OLS 97 OLS 97 OLS 97 
Capital Intensity 0.16 0.10 0.15 0.11 0.06 0.10 
 [23.11]** [15.31]** [21.42]** [14.44]** [8.06]** [12.55]** 
Foreign Share less than 30% 0.63 0.55 0.21 0.31 0.28 0.00 
  [3.99]** [3.93]** [1.31] [1.78] [1.77] [0.00] 
Foreign Share in 30%-49% 0.83 0.83 0.48 0.74 0.77 0.45 
  [12.90]** [14.42]** [7.03]** [9.95]** [11.57]** [5.64]** 
Foreign Share in 49%-90% 0.92 0.82 0.57 0.91 0.82 0.61 
  [15.23]** [15.22]** [8.41]** [13.43]** [13.54]** [7.86]** 
Foreign Share more than 90% 1.12 1.07 0.76 1.13 1.05 0.79 
  [11.24]** [11.99]** [7.20]** [9.85]** [10.21]** [6.47]** 
Industry Dummies  inc.   inc.  
Regional Dummies   inc.   inc. 
Observations  14759 14759 14759 13425 13425 13425 
R-squared  0.06 0.25 0.11 0.03 0.23 0.09 
Capital for 1996 was used in all regressions. 
Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets.* significant at the 5% level, ** significant at the 1% level 
 
We also tested for differences in productivity between foreign-owned firms of 
different size. Small firms tend to be easier for a foreign owner to manage. Moreover, it is 
likely that most of small foreign-owned firms in our database are start-up firms, while large 
firms are privatized ones. Therefore, small firms can be more productive than larger ones. To 
test this hypothesis, we divided all foreign firms into three groups according to size based on 
the number of employees: the group of small firms, which includes the lower 30% of all firms 
in the industry, the group of large firms, which comprises 30% of firms with the biggest 
number of employees, and the medium size group, which includes the rest of the firms. Table 
2-3 reports the results of production function estimation (1), where the fdi dummy was 
replaced with three different dummies for small, medium-sized and large foreign-owned 
firms, and a capital to labor ratio was allowed to differ across different groups of firms. 
Surprisingly, large and medium-sized firms are found to be more efficient than small ones in 
all specifications. Productivity increases with the size of a firm, and the difference in 
productivity between all size groups is significant. Hence, in contrast to our conjecture, small 
firms are not more but less productive than larger ones. 
 20 
Table 2-3. Productivity of Foreign-Owned Firms by Employment Size. Log of Labor 
Productivity as a Dependent Variable. 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
  OLS 96 OLS 96 OLS 96 OLS 97 OLS 97 OLS 97 
Cap.Intensity(Small) 0.16 0.11 0.15 0.13 0.09 0.12 
 [14.97]** [11.65]* [14.42]** [10.51]** [7.99]** [9.72]** 
Cap.Intensity(Medium) 0.16 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.05 0.08 
 [14.58]** [10.19]* [13.35]** [7.84]** [4.14]** [6.74]** 
Cap.Intensity(Big) 0.15 0.06 0.14 0.09 0.01 0.07 
 [10.59]** [4.18]** [9.64]** [5.72]** [0.42] [4.51]** 
Small FDI firms 0.77 0.75 0.41 0.62 0.61 0.28 
  [14.41]** [15.63]* [6.53]** [10.01]** [11.08]** [3.92]** 
Medium FDI firms  0.94 0.93 0.60 1.03 1.00 0.70 
  [12.19]** [13.45]* [7.33]** [11.53]** [12.57]** [7.44]** 
Large FDI firms  1.36 1.21 1.01 1.42 1.29 1.10 
  [12.88]** [12.77]* [9.29]** [13.07]** [13.30]** [9.79]** 
Industry Dummies  inc.   inc.  
Regional Dummies   inc.   inc. 
Observations  14759 14759 14759 13425 13425 13425 
R-squared  0.06 0.25 0.11 0.04 0.24 0.09 
Capital for 1996 was used in all regressions 
Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. * significant at the 5% level, ** significant at the 1% level 
 
The quality of human capital in the region may put restraints on the scope of 
technologies that foreign owners can install in their domestic affiliates. If it is difficult to find 
workers and managers with the required level of skills, then foreign investors may prefer to 
install less advanced technologies. On the other hand, education is a signal of intelligence and 
ability to learn - it is easier to train better educated people. Therefore, we can expect foreign 
firms to be more productive if they work in a region with better educated labor. To test this 
conjecture, we included in the production function the interaction term between the variable 
controlling for FDI, i.e. the fdi dummy or the fdi share, and the percentage of adults with 
secondary education in the region. This variable is insignificant in OLS specifications for both 
the 1996 and 1997 regressions, independently of whether the fdi dummy or the fdi share is 
used as an independent variable. (see Table 2-4, Table 2-5, specifications 1-6). The possible 
explanation of this result is that Russian labor force is on average very well educated, so 
human capital is not among the factors affecting foreign investors' decisions. Incidentally, the 
coefficient at the education variable is positive and highly significant in absolutely all the 
 21 
specifications, confirming the hypothesis of the modern growth theory that human capital is 
an important factor of production. 
Finally, we tested for the differences between the productivity of foreign-owned firms 
operating in more or less reform-oriented regions. We believe that firms in more reform-
oriented regions face less harassment from the regional authorities. Thus, they can introduce 
more advanced technologies and manage their firms more efficiently, as they do not have to 
comply with labor hoarding requirements or other local regulations imposed by the regional 
or local authorities.22  To test this hypothesis, we included into the regressions an interaction 
term between the dummy for foreign-owned firms or the share of the foreign partner, and the 
index of economic reform progress. The reform progress index was constructed as a weighted 
average of the degree of regulation of food prices, the proportion of goods and services with 
regulated prices (both measures were included in the index with the negative sign), the share 
of private enterprises in trade, catering and household services (all three measures are as of 
1996), growth in the number of enterprises, and the number of small businesses per capita. 
The weights are equal to the Russian average figure for the corresponding variable. The 
results for 1997 show that foreign firms located in more reform-oriented regions are more 
productive than others (see Table 2-4,Table 2-5, specification 7-12). In the 1996 regressions, 
this coefficient is significant only in the specification with the fdi dummy as a controlling 
variable for FDI, which we estimated using simple OLS without controlling for industry-
specific fixed effect. Hence, we have a weak evidence that not only do reform-oriented 
regions attract more FDI, as is shown by Manaenkov (2000), but those FDI are also more 
productive. The reform progress variable itself is positive in all the regressions, and 
significant almost everywhere. Therefore, reform progress seems to be positively associated 
with the productivity of firms in the region. 
                                                          
22 When Phillips decided to change the structure of the labor force of its plant in Voronezh, regional government 
intervened and did not allow most of the changes Phillips wanted to implement. 
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Table 2-4. Education and Reforms effects on FDI productivity in 1996-7. Log of Labor 
Productivity as a Dependent Variable. 
  1996   1997  
  Treatreg OLS OLS Treatreg OLS OLS 
Secondary education [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Capital Intensity 0.091 0.155 0.094 0.048 0.104 0.053 
 [14.18]** [22.17]** [14.60]** [6.76]** [13.40]** [7.34]** 
fdi Dummy 0.268 0.657 0.644 -1.499 0.612 0.56 
 [2.49]* [14.79]** [16.10]** [3.10]** [1.54] [1.56] 
fdi Dummy*Sec.Education 0.011 0.006 0.002 0.020 0 0.001 
 [2.13]* [1.19] [0.53] [3.42]** [0.01] [0.14] 
Secondary Education Level 0.034 0.038 0.034 0.033 0.039 0.032 
  [15.58]** [15.39]** [15.51]** [13.61]** [14.49]** [13.39]** 
Economic reforms [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] 
Capital Intensity 0.099 0.162 0.099 0.055 0.112 0.058 
 [15.23]** [22.98]** [15.31]** [7.58]** [14.31]** [8.02]** 
fdi Dummy 0.801 0.881 0.834 0.155 0.78 0.75 
 [9.79]** [21.67]** [22.80]** [0.89] [16.50]** [17.60]** 
fdi Dummy*Econ.Reforms  0.02 0.035 0.017 0.131 0.093 0.067 
 [1.18] [1.98]* [1.08] [5.39]** [4.60]** [3.72]** 
Index of Economic Reforms  0.017 0.022 0.017 0.014 0.011 0.014 
  [4.19]** [4.92]** [4.19]** [2.76]** [1.96] [2.74]** 
Industry Dummies inc.  inc. inc.  inc. 
Observations  14738 14738 14738 13411 13411 13411 
Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets.* significant at the 5% level; ** significant at the 1% level  
Treatment variables: Restricted Industries, Big Enterprises, Index of Reforms ( for Education regressions ) , 
dummy for Moscow. 
Table 2-5. Education and Reforms effects on FDI productivity in 1996-7. Log of Labor 
Productivity as a Dependent Variable. 
  1996   1997  
  Ivreg OLS OLS Ivreg OLS OLS 
Secondary education [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Capital Intensity 0.034 0.152 0.09 -0.011 0.103 0.05 
 [3.23]** [21.83]* [14.14]* [0.95] [13.26]* [7.04]** 
fdi Share -2.287 1.074 1.037 -2.809 1.031 0.998 
 [4.69]** [14.22]* [15.28]* [4.91]** [11.89]* [12.79]*
Fdi Share*Sec.Education 0.142 0.009 0.005 0.164 0 0.002 
 [6.59]** [1.05] [0.60] [6.38]** [0.02] [0.28] 
Secondary Education Level 0.042 0.039 0.035 0.041 0.039 0.033 
  [16.76]* [16.44]* [16.48]* [14.53]* [15.10]* [13.99]*
Economic reforms [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] 
Capital Intensity 0.095 0.159 0.095 0.044 0.109 0.054 
 [14.69]* [22.50]* [14.69]* [5.25]** [13.98]* [7.56]** 
Fdi Share 1.347 1.434 1.347 0.685 1.301 1.226 
 [21.92]* [20.96]* [21.92]* [2.75]** [16.22]* [17.01]*
Fdi Share*Econ.Reforms  0.011 0.028 0.011 0.150 0.126 0.095 
 [0.41] [0.95] [0.41] [3.86]** [3.69]** [3.13]** 
Index of Economic Reforms  0.018 0.024 0.018 0.018 0.014 0.016 
  [4.53]** [5.36]** [4.53]** [3.57]** [2.46]* [3.18]** 
Industry Dummies inc.  inc. inc.  inc. 
Observations  14738 14738 14738 13411 13411 13411 
Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. * significant at the 5% level; ** significant at the 1% level  
Instruments: Restricted Industries, Big Enterprises, Index of Reforms ( for Education regressions ), dummy for 
Moscow. 
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3. Spillovers from Foreign-Owned Firms 
 
The governments of many developing and transition economies try to attract FDI to 
their countries because they expect FDI to have a positive effect on domestic firms. Such 
expectations are based on the common belief that entry of foreign firms increases the extent of 
technological diffusion from foreign to domestic firms. FDI increase availability of 
information regarding foreign technologies, production methods, and product design. It also 
facilitates copying of foreign technologies by domestic firms, as it is usually easier for 
domestic firms to imitate the technology and products of a nearby competitor than those of a 
firm located abroad. One of the channels of technology diffusion is labor mobility between 
foreign-owned and domestic firms. Workers and managers who work at foreign-owned firms, 
acquire knowledge of western technologies, which they can bring to domestic firms. In the 
case of transition economies, FDI can be beneficial to domestic firms not only because of 
technology diffusion, but also because of diffusion of managerial techniques. Domestic firms 
can copy the organizational structure of foreign-owned firms and their managerial style and 
organizational methods. Additionally, they can hire managers who previously worked at a 
foreign-owned firm. By doing so, domestic firms can benefit from managerial experience of 
and training by foreign firms. 
The second channel through which the entry of foreign-owned firms can affect 
domestic firms is an increase in competition. Increased competition forces domestic firms to 
restructure faster and, therefore, positively affects their productivity. Restructuring does not 
have to be limited to copying foreign products. On a market for differentiated products, 
domestic companies can reoptimize their products structure in such a way that will enables 
them to find a product niche where they can exploit local taste peculiarities and supply goods 
undersupplied by the foreign companies. 
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However, the effect of competition can be negative, particularly in the first years after 
foreign investments were made. Since foreign firms are more competitive, they can drive 
domestic firms out of the market or force them to produce at less than efficient capacity, thus 
adversely affecting productivity of domestic firms. 
In this section we test whether spillovers from foreign firms to domestic ones is 
positive or negative, i.e., we test whether the positive effect of technology transfer and 
restructuring outweighs the negative effect of increased competition. Coe and Helpman 
(1995) and Coe, Helpman and Hoffmaister (1997) argue that the effect of foreign R&D 
capital on total factor productivity can be captured by regressing total factor productivity on 
the sum of R&D expenditures of foreign trade partners weighted by trade shares. Using 
similar logic, we can measure the effect of foreign technological capital and managerial 
experience on total factor productivity of domestic firms by introducing in the equation (1) a 
proxy for foreign firms' presence in the industry. Following Blomstrom and Sjoholm (1999), 
we use the share of foreign-owned firms in the output of a 4-digit industry as such a proxy. 
Since the share of foreign firms in industrial production was changing over time, we 
do not have difficulty estimating the firm level fixed effect regressions as was the case in the 
productivity regressions. We test for spillovers from foreign firms, using the following 
equation: 23  
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where spill is the proxy for foreign presence defined above. 
Notice that the fdi dummy and fdi share drop out of the equation because they are 
constant over time. 
In the first specification we follow Aitken and Harrison (1999) and Konings (1999) 
and estimate a specification of equation (2) for 1993-1997, which only controls for the firm-
 25 
specific fixed effect. The results are presented in column (1) of Table 3-1. The spillover 
coefficient is negative and significant, which is consistent with the results of Aitken and 
Harrison (1999), and Konings (1999). However, this specification can be incorrect in the 
Russian case. During the period under study industrial output was declining. On the other 
hand, firms used a labor hoarding strategy, so labor productivity, measured by the output to 
employment ratio, was declining as well. At the same time, the share of output of the foreign-
owned firms in the industry was increasing in most of the industries (see Figure 2). Therefore, 
instead of reflecting the effect of the presence of foreign firms on domestic firms' 
productivity, the negative sign at our proxy for spillovers can pick up the downward 
productivity time trend. To correct this misspecification, we reestimated equation (2) 
controlling not only for the firm fixed effect, but also for the time-specific fixed effect. 
Column (2) of Table 3-1 reports these results. The coefficients at the year dummies are 
negative and significant. The absolute size of the year dummies coefficients increases over 
time, which reflect the downward trend in productivity. On the over hand, the spillover 
coefficient became positive but insignificant. Insignificance of the coefficient can be justified 
in two ways. First of all, it is conceivable that there were no spillovers from foreign-owned to 
domestic firms in Russia. The inflow of FDI was rather modest, so it is not impossible that it 
did not affect the behavior of domestic firms. However, it is also possible that foreign entry 
had positive influence on some firms and negative influence on others, while the average 
effect on all firms was insignificant. To test for such possibility, we divided the sample into 
two groups of firms: small firms with less than 200 employees, and other firms, with 
employment between 200 and 1000 people. We chose these two groups for the following 
reasons. First of all, privatization and control over firms with less than 200 employees was 
usually performed by the local administrations. On the other hand, foreign-owned firms are 
usually rather small ( see Table 4-1 which presents summary statistics for the three groups of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
23 We do the test for the entire sample of firms, which includes both foreign-owned and domestic firms. The 
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firms). Therefore, if entry of foreign firms increases competition, than small firms are 
expected to suffer more than large ones. Additionally, while outside financing is a big 
problem for all Russian firms, small firms seem to suffer from it even more then the large 
ones.24  The regression results for the sample of medium-sized domestic firms are 
summarized in Table 3-2 , and those for small firms are in Table 3-3. Column (1) of each 
table presents the basic results. The spillover effect seem to differ substantially between 
samples. While coefficient at the variable spill is positive and significant in the sample of 
medium-sized firms, it is negative and significant in the other sample. This result is quite 
robust, and remains true in different specifications. Therefore, it appears in our regressions 
that foreign entry has different effect on firms of different size. Small firms, can not sustain 
foreign competition, and are driven out of the market, while larger firms seem to benefit from 
foreign entry. As was mentioned above, financial difficulties of small firms can be responsible 
for such differences. 
Table 3-1. Effect of Foreign Ownership on Productivity of Domestic Firms: Fixed Effect 
Estimation with Log Productivity as a Dependent Variable. 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Capital Intensity -0.32 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 
 [137.59]** [10.86]** [10.88]** [10.70]** [10.72]** [10.72]** 
Industry Spillovers -2.85 0.12 0.20 0.17 0.11 0.26 
 [36.92]** [1.60] [2.61]** [2.14]* [1.43] [3.22]** 
Regional Spillovers   -0.32   -0.38 
   [6.58]**   [7.56]** 
Spillovers*SecEducation     0.07  0.09 
    [5.31]**  [6.82]** 
Spillovers*Index of Reforms      -0.025 -0.039 
     [1.11] [1.68] 
Year dummies  inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. 
Observations  102707 102707 102707 102598 102598 102598 
Number of firms  29059 29059 29059 29021 29021 29021 
R-squared  0.25 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 
Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. * significant at the 5% level, ** significant at the 1% level 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
exclusion of the foreign-owned companies from the sample does not affect the results much. 
24 More on this issue is in Volchkova (2000). 
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Table 3-2. Effect of Foreign Ownership on Productivity of Domestic Medium Firms: 
Fixed Effect Estimation with Log Productivity as a Dependent Variable. 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Capital Intensity 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
 [10.54]** [10.55]** [10.43]** [10.43]** [10.43]** 
Industry Spillovers 0.58 0.71 0.59 0.59 0.73 
 [5.09]** [6.10]** [5.12]** [5.10]** [6.26]** 
Regional Spillovers  -0.44   -0.51 
  [6.05]**   [6.87]** 
Spillovers*SecEducation    0.05  0.08 
   [3.00]**  [4.37]** 
Spillovers*Index of Reforms     0.008 -0.004 
    [0.24] [0.11] 
Year dummies inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. 
Observations  47795 47795 47749 47749 47749 
Number of firms  11954 11954 11938 11938 11938 
R-squared  0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 
Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. * significant at the 5% level, ** significant at the 1% level 
Table 3-3. Effect of Foreign Ownership on Productivity of Domestic Small Firms: Fixed 
Effect Estimation with Log Productivity as a Dependent Variable. 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Capital Intensity 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.026 
 [4.96]** [4.96]** [4.90]** [4.88]** [4.91]** 
Industry Spillovers -0.38 -0.33 -0.28 -0.41 -0.25 
 [3.62]** [3.14]** [2.66]** [3.92]** [2.32]* 
Regional Spillovers  -0.22   -0.25 
  [3.27]**   [3.65]** 
Spillovers*SecEducation    0.077  0.09 
   [4.12]**  [4.84]** 
Spillovers*Index of Reforms     -0.064 -0.075 
    [1.98]* [2.28]* 
Year dummies inc. inc. inc. inc. inc. 
Observations  54912 54912 54849 54849 54849 
Number of firms  17105 17105 17083 17083 17083 
R-squared  0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 
Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. * significant at the 5% level, ** significant at the 1% level 
It has been argued (Aitken and Harrison (1999) and Aitken, Hanson, and Harrison 
(1997)) that spillovers from foreign firms can be more extensive on the local level than on the 
country level. It may be easier for domestic firms to copy technologies of their nearby 
competitors, than of the firms, located far away. In such a large country as Russia, distance 
can play an important role for technology spillovers. On the other hand, labor mobility inside 
Russian regions is higher than interregional mobility, so labor and management turnover 
between domestic and foreign firms located in the same region can be higher than between 
firms in different regions. We test this hypothesis by introducing into equation (2) the variable 
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which measures the share of foreign-owned firms' output in the total output of firms from the 
same industry within the same region. The coefficient at this variable (see column (3) of 
Table 3-1 and column (2) of Table 3-2 and Table 3-3) is negative and significant at the 1% 
level. Hence spillovers are negative on the local level, and this is true of both small and 
medium-sized firms. This result is consistent with the results of Aitken and Harrison (1999), 
who also did not find any positive local spillovers in the sample of Venezuelan firms. After 
introduction of the variable for the local spillovers, the coefficient at the overall spillovers in 
the sample of all firms becomes positive and significant at the 1% level, the absolute value of 
the corresponding positive coefficient in the sample of medium-sized firms increases, and the 
absolute size of negative spillovers on the small firms decreases. Therefore, our estimation 
results suggest that most of the negative spillover effect from increase competition is realized 
on the local level. 
Table 3-4. Test of the Effect of Foreign Competition on Output of Domestic Firms. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ALL BIG SMALL 
Industry Spillovers 0.84 1.54 0.066 
 [10.14]** [11.99]** [0.61] 
Regional Spillovers -0.30 -0.50 -0.11 
 [5.94]** [6.51]** [1.71] 
D94 -0.66 -0.69 -0.63 
 [104.9]** [71.71]** [76.79]** 
D95 -1.07 -1.08 -1.05 
 [167.0]** [110.5]** [124.7]** 
D96 -1.39 -1.45 -1.32 
 [201.1]** [143.3]** [139.5]** 
D97 -1.58 -1.68 -1.47 
 [211.6]** [156.5]** [140.3]** 
Constant 4.54 5.53 3.70 
 [887.0]** [710.8]** [550.1]** 
Observations 110758 50838 59920 
Number of firms 29983 12122 17861 
R-squared 0.45 0.47 0.43 
Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets. * significant at the 5% level, ** significant at the 1% level 
Following Aitken and Harrison (1999), we conducted a direct test of the effect of 
increased competition on firms output. If increased competition forces domestic firms to 
decrease output or quit the industry, than regressing output on foreign competition measures 
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should produce negative coefficients at the competition measure. We report the results of such 
regressions in Table 3-4. The coefficient at the regional spillovers is negative and significant 
at least at the 10% level both in the overall sample an in each subgroup of the firms. This 
result additionally confirms our hypothesis that foreign entry forces local firms to decrease 
their output at least in the short run. 
Borensztein, De Grigorio and Lee (1995) has shown that the effect of FDI on domestic 
productivity depends crucially on the stock of human capital in the host country. A similar 
argument can be found in Blomstrom (1986) or Blomstrom, Globerman and Kokko (1999), 
who claim that spillover effect depends on the technological gap between the firms in the host 
countries and the foreign firms. To test for importance of this effect in Russia we included in 
the regression an interaction term between the industrial spillovers and the variable, 
controlling for the population education level in the region. The above variable was computed 
as the difference between the percentage of adult population with secondary education in the 
region, and Russian average percentage of adult population with secondary education. The 
Russian labor market is very segmented, and interregional labor mobility is rather limited, so 
we believe that it is regional human capital stock that is relevant in this analysis.25  The results 
for the overall sample are presented in the forth column of Table 3-1, and similar regressions 
for the samples of small and medium-sized firms separately are reported in the third columns 
of Table 3-2 and Table 3-3. The coefficient at the spillovers variable in the overall sample is 
positive and significant, suggesting that Russian average level of education is high enough to 
guarantee positive spillovers from foreign-owned firms. The coefficient at the cross-term 
between education attainment and spillovers is positive and highly significant and all three 
samples. Hence, an increase in the share of educated people in the total population of the 
                                                          
25We can not control for educational level in the industry, because such data are unavailable. 
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region increases the ability of firms located in this region to benefit from foreign direct 
investment.26 
One can argue that in the faster reforming regions there are better conditions for 
spillovers from foreign to domestic firms. For example, regional governments' subsidies to 
domestic firms can be smaller in such regions. Hence, domestic firms in faster reforming 
regions can have stronger incentives to restructure and compete with foreign owned firms 
than domestic firms in the non-reforming regions, which, instead of restructuring, can bargain 
with the local governments for higher protection from foreign entrants and for larger 
subsidies. We test this conjecture in the following way. We introduce into the regression an 
interaction term between spillovers and the index of reform progress in the region. 
Introduction of this term into regression does not change the results of the previous 
estimation, and the interaction term itself is negative but insignificant in the overall sample, 
positive but insignificant, in the sample of medium-sized firms, and negative and significant 
in the sample of small firms. Therefore, there is no difference between the spillovers from 
foreign firms in faster and slower reforming regions in the case of the medium-sized firms. As 
far as small firms are concerned, they suffer more from foreign competition in the regions, 
which reform faster. More reform-oriented regions tend to provide less protection against 
foreign competition to domestic firms, located on its territory, which can explain our finding. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
This paper studies the effect of foreign direct investment on Russian firms. It 
compares productivity between fully domestically and at least partially foreign-owned firm, 
and it also looks at spillovers from foreign-owned to domestic firms. 
                                                          
26 The education attainment variable we have does not vary over time during the period of consideration, so it 
drops out of the fixed effect regression. 
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The comparative analysis of productivity shows that foreign firms are more productive 
than Russian ones.27  This finding confirms the hypothesis that foreign-owned firms have 
advantage over domestic ones in terms of access to technologies and better management. This 
technological and managerial advantage seems to be more important than knowledge of the 
local market, since firms with more than 90% of foreign ownership are more productive than 
joint ventures with a smaller foreign share. Too small a foreign share ( below 30%) provides 
little productivity advantage over domestically-owned firms. If the foreign partner does not 
have sufficient control over the firm, then he lacks incentives to introduce new technologies, 
and power to force the efficient restructuring of the firm. Therefore, productivity of such 
firms is lower than that of other joint ventures. 
Additionally, we find that productivity of foreign-owned firms depends positively on 
the size of firms. 
Education level of Russian personnel seems to be sufficient for successful installation 
of new technologies: there is no difference between productivity of foreign owned firms in 
regions with higher or lower education level. 
Reform orientation of the region seems to be one of the major factors affecting foreign 
direct investment. Daniil Manaenkov (2000) has shown that the index of reform progress of 
the region is one of the most significant determinants of foreign investment in Russia. The 
higher is the index, the higher is the probability of investment in the region. In this paper we 
show that the difference in productivity of domestic and foreign firms also depends on the 
index of reform progress in the region. In more reform-oriented regions, foreign firms are 
more productive than in other regions. Anecdotal evidence suggests that in the slowly 
reforming regions regional and local authorities try to heavily regulate foreign-owned firms. 
                                                          
27 However, there is no difference between the rates of productivity growth of domestic and foreign-owned 
firms. Moreover, productivity growth is often slower at foreign than at domestic firms. Given that the former are 
considerably more productive than the latter, and that they appear in the dataset only after foreign investments 
were made, we can conclude that restructuring of foreign-owned firms right after foreign investment took the 
form of a productivity jump followed by slow growth, while the restructuring of domestic firms is a slow 
process. 
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Authorities intervene in hiring and firing process of foreign-owned firms, thus slowing down 
restructuring. In addition, taxes and bribes are higher in less reform-oriented regions, and the 
threat of expropriation of firms from foreign investors is also quite serious. Such policies can 
scare off foreign investors, and negatively affect their decision to import new technologies 
into Russia. 
In addition to direct benefits of FDI in terms of faster restructuring of foreign-owned 
firms, foreign direct investment is often expected to yield indirect benefits, i.e., to have a 
positive spillover effect on domestic firms. It is easier for domestic firms to copy technologies 
and managerial practices from the foreign-owned firms located in the same country than from 
those located abroad. Labor turnover between foreign-owned and domestic firms is one of the 
main spillover channels. However, competition can drive domestic firms out of the market or 
force them to decrease output below the cost-minimizing level. Therefore, as a result of 
competition, productivity of domestic firms may decrease. We find that the effect of foreign 
entry on productivity of domestic firms depends on the location and size of the firms. Firms 
located in the same region and small firms, have to decrease their output as a response to 
increased foreign competition. At the same time, productivity of medium-sized firms goes up 
with an increase in the foreign share of production in the same industry. Therefore, we have 
indirect evidence that foreign entry facilitates technological and managerial techniques 
leakages and forces domestic firms to restructure faster. The size and quality of human capital 
in the regions seems to be one of the main determinants of the size of the spillover effect. The 
level of education of adult population in Russia is quite high, so spillovers are positive in 
almost all the regions. However, regions with higher educational level benefit from FDI to a 
greater extent. 
The speed of reforms seems to have no effect on spillovers, and benefits of domestic 
firms from presence of foreign-owned firms are not significantly different between faster and 
slower reforming regions. 
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Our results allow important conclusions regarding economic policy to be made. We 
show that Russian industry benefits from foreign direct investment both directly and 
indirectly. Direct benefits come from technological and managerial improvements in the firms 
that have received foreign direct investment, while indirect benefits result from positive 
spillovers to domestic firms. This result suggests that Russia can benefit a lot if it succeeds in 
attracting a substantial inflow of FDI. We also show that bad policies can not only prevent 
foreign firms from investing in Russia, but also negatively affect the quality of investment. In 
the reform-resistant regions, the productivity of foreign-owned firms is significantly lower 
than in other regions. Hence, further reforms will result not only in the overall higher volume 
of foreign investment but also in the inflow of more productive investments. Finally, the role 
of education and human capital should not be underestimated. The skills level of Russian 
labor is high enough to attract modern technologies, but the spillover effect depends crucially 
on the level of human capital in a particular region. Hence, preserving and strengthening the 
education system will allow Russia to benefit from FDI to an even greater extent. 
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Appendix 
Table 4-1. Sample characteristics. 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Foreign-owned firms      
Number of firms 1256 1560 1804 1714 1576 
average employment, persons 96 83 83 84 93 
average output, mln Rubles 1601 4070 11404 17752 25210 
Domestic firms      
number of firms 21785 22990 24878 21375 19823 
average employment, persons 247 229 203 209 202 
average output, mln Rubles 1559 4505 9706 13290 14885 
average capital, mln Rubles 191 5388 15065 38110 41264 
Domestic firms Medium-sized *      
number of firms 9729 10245 10279 8018 9524 
average employment, persons 430 396 372 355 335 
average output, mln Rubles 2898 8321 18667 24535 26841 
average capital, mln Rubles 348 10040 28281 68422 70216 
Domestic firms Small-sized *      
number of firms 11781 12270 13057 8758 9046 
average employment, persons 96 91 81 73 73 
average output, mln Rubles 452 1350 3223 4915 5728 
average capital, mln Rubles 60 1473 4579 12005 10741 
 
* Medium-sized firms are those with maximum employment across years greater that 200 and less that 1000. 
Average figures are taken from the regression sample 
